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RCMP,Police Services, Reserve Military Police (Police Services on Class C call out) working closely with the Canadian Military in Afghanistan

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RCMP,Police Services, Reserve Military Police (Police Services on Class C call out) working closely with the Canadian Military in Afghanistan Empty RCMP,Police Services, Reserve Military Police (Police Services on Class C call out) working closely with the Canadian Military in Afghanistan

Post by Guest Thu 13 Sep 2012, 09:48

The following is the link to the actual article obtained from Canadian Combat Camera of the CAF web site. There are some good photos of the RCMP Police Services working in Afghanistan during the Combat Mission.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_13/iss_1/CAJ_vol13.1_10_e.pdf

As part of its commitment to the Government of Afghanistan, Canada has invested significant resources
towards the betterment of the Afghan Police Institution. Several years on, it is prudent to evaluate
whether the money has been well spent and the resources properly allocated. At the root of the issues are
several questions: Is the present mentoring model effective? Is it having the desired stabilizing influence?
And, is the Canadian model adapting to the changing circumstances effectively or quickly enough? To
evaluate the issues, it is helpful to look at the body of lessons provided by other police forces involved
in security sector reform (SSR) reaching back a half century. Even a cursory review of these missions
reveals that advancement of police reform in failed states is not an easy task. When juxtaposed against
Canada’s Afghan mission, the evidence suggests that our current approach is good but is not as flexible,
or as far reaching, as it potentially could be. What is required is a new “optimized” Canadian Forces /
CIVPOL integration model that emphasizes a transitional
1
approach to mentoring the initiation and
reinforcement as well as
the eventual weaning of a
professionalized indigenous
police force.
In light of this evidence, and
using Afghanistan as a model,
the intent of this article is
to present a strategy for the
phased integration, influence,
and evolution of Canadian
police mentoring and to
suggest a model that could
potentially serve as a template
for future conflicts.
resurrectinG FaileD
states
Since the fall of the Iron
Curtain, there has been
an escalating interest in
the “failed-state” phenomena, which has generated much critical thought concerning appropriate
intervention models. Indeed, it has been suggested that, “Insecurity in the 21
st
century appears to come
less from the collisions of powerful states than from the debris of imploding ones.”
2
Research bodies such as the RAND Corporation, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and
the Centre for Global Development, among others, have placed increased resources into the analysis
of failed states, and for good reason. A recent study by the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies summarizes an argument which has been widely adopted by the international community, that
is, “One of the principal lessons of the events of September 11
th
is that failed states matter—not just
for humanitarian reasons but for national security as well. If left unattended, such states can become
sanctuaries for terrorist networks with a global reach . . . who exploit the dysfunctional environment.”
3
Figure 1: A truly diverse team, Cpl Osellame (MP) and Pte Kirkwood (1 RCR)
return from an arduous patrol in Pashmul South with their assigned Afghan police
DSCF0954 Taken by: Cpl Bucci, 2MPU106 The Candian Army Journal Volume 13.1 2010
In a similar vein, Mark Turner and Martin Wolf, writers for the Financial Times, reinforce the immediacy
of the matter by arguing that, “failed or failing states are among the great challenges of our age . . . .
They spread chaos to their neighbours and beyond. They are actual or potential sources of terrorism,
organized crime, drugs, disease, and refugees . . . . Something needs to be done. Yet nobody knows quite
what.”
4
The answer to the question “What to do?” is the subject of much comprehensive study. At the
risk of oversimplifying the matter, published authors tend to render common conclusions regarding
the way forward. Foremost among these recommendations are the requirements for security system
reform, governance reform (to include rule of law and democratization), development (essential public
services, health, water, and utilities), and the fostering of legitimate trade. But if success in reform is to
be expected, the first, and most critical, step must begin with the issue of security. Without it, all other
changes run the risk of being overtaken by forces beyond the control of the legitimate government in
power. To help understand what is meant by SSR, we turn to the Organization for Economic
Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
5
who define SSR as:. . . the overall objective of SSR is to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty
reduction and democracy. This secure environment rests upon two essential pillars: i) the ability of the state
to generate conditions that mitigate vulnerabilities to which its people are exposed; and ii) the ability of the
state to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or address security threats that affect
society’s well-being.
6
In Afghanistan, security is a policing issue; therefore, in this case, it is presumed that the Afghan police
institution will be the frontline tool employed to mitigate the immediate security vulnerabilities of the
Afghan people.
“ . . . failed or failing states are among the great challenges of our age . . . .
They spread chaos to their neighbours and beyond. They are actual or potential
sources of terrorism, organized crime, drugs, disease, and refugees . . . .
Something needs to be done. Yet nobody knows quite what.”
successes and struGGles: police reform in Failed states

Fortunately, many good international case studies pertaining to successes and struggles in police reform
exist. Indeed, the International Peace Academy concludes that the rising number of organizations
carrying out police reform is evidence of the increasing importance attached to it.
7
We are cautioned, however, that this endeavour is not for the weak-willed, as emerging police forces are oftentimes cut off
from the populations they are meant to serve and protect, with many acting and operating more like
military contingents than public security officers. This is presently the case in most of Afghanistan.
Notwithstanding the preceding caution, there exists a body of lessons that aid in the formulation of best
practices. From the British experience in Malaya (1948–60), we learn that training strong indigenous
police leadership, supported by sustained mentorship, should have top priority. After this, schooling in
the field of criminal intelligence received praise, as did the steady transition to a “Malayanization” of the
security force,
8
and the weeding out of corrupt police officers. In the Cyprus campaign (1955–59) similar
themes surfaced, particularly the need for professional indigenous police leadership, education, and
human intelligence. In tandem, these case studies conclude that, “because of the small unit nature of the
conflicts, the frontline counterinsurgency force was the police . . . effective counterinsurgency campaigns
rely on good human intelligence, and no military unit can match a good police unit in developing an
accurate human intelligence picture of their area of operations.”
9
Alice Hills, in her analysis of police reform in sub-Sahara Africa, sees it a different way. She concludes
that training and resources are insufficient in the absence of appropriate political direction or sanction.
10
The corollary is that a clear and consistent police mandate, combined with a governmental commitment
to change, is the starting point for effective reform.

www.armyforces.gc.ca/caj 107  ARTICLES

In looking at the American experience in Iraq, the main effort has been focused on combating
corruption and abuse among the police force. Indeed, a 2006 report from northeast of Baghdad
found that 75 percent of Iraqis did not trust the police enough to tip them off to insurgent activity.
11
In response, successful reform strategies include exposing police to positive models of behaviour,
standardizing mentoring across all sectors, establishing a Ministry of the Interior Ethics Centre, and
recommending the creation of an Internal Affairs and Inspector General capability.
What is clear from all available evidence is that brief, ad hoc, training programs are doomed to failure.
Similarly, to pursue strategies that run counter to the positive lessons learned from international
missions is to accept a suboptimal outcome. So what then is the best approach for Afghanistan?
. . . to pursue strategies that run counter to the positive lessons learned from international missions
is to accept a suboptimal outcome. So what then is the best approach for Afghanistan?
builDinG policinG in aFGHanistan:

101
Like Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan is not a good one. To reach the level of policing professionalism
found in first world countries, ingrained institutional and cultural practices must be overcome.
The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and The Center for Strategic and International Studies
join in their bleak assessment of the current state of Afghan policing and reform. Specifically, it is
believed that many Afghans still perceive the Afghan National Police (ANP) to be part of the security
problem rather than part of the solution.

12
Chief among these concerns are examples of widespread
corruption, local-level extortion, illiteracy, a propensity to not respect international norms regarding
human rights, and general unprofessionalism. Add to this drug use, juvenile members, the omnipresent
DSCF0767 Taken by: Sgt McGougan, 2 MPU
Figure 2: A POMLT on foot patrol in South Pashmul. Human intelligence and gaining respect are fundamental tenants
of lasting stability efforts 108 The Candian Army Journal Volume 13.1 2010
temptation to dabble in drug trafficking, patrimony, lack of pay (or pilfering of pay by provincial or
district leadership), and it becomes clear that truth is stranger than fiction.
Finally, and unfortunately for the cadre of ANP actually committed to change, the Afghan insurgency
appears to be acutely aware of ANP vulnerabilities, both individually and collectively. To that end,
the ANP have become the primary target of insurgents; for example, in 2006 alone, 627 ANP were killed.

And the trend continues. Despite this despondent backdrop, however, certain recommendations have
emerged. These include calling for a shared vision and strategy for the ANP, developing a comprehensive
rule of law strategy, making donor assistance conditional on Ministry of the Interior reform, prioritizing
quality of ANP over quantity, and prioritizing fiscal sustainability of the security sector.
13
canaDian mentorinG capabilities Although Canada has had an active combat role in Afghanistan since 2002, the Canadian emphasis on
police capacity building is relatively new. The introduction of a Canadian whole-of-government approach
in the fall of 2007 coincided with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) vision of
empowering Afghan institutions to stand on their own through focused professionalization
and mentoring. As evidence of this, the Manley Report recommended to Parliament that, “Canada should
continue with its responsibility for security in Kandahar beyond February 2009 . . . but with increasing
emphasis on training the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) expeditiously [army and police] . . .
as the ANSF gain capability, Canada’s combat role should be significantly reduced.”
14
In its initial follow-up to the Manley Report, the Interdepartmental Task Force highlighted six policy
priorities for the region, the first of which is enabling the ANSF to sustain a more secure environment and
to promote law and order. Specific to police development, the stated Canadian objective for 2011
is to expect that the ANP will demonstrate an increased capacity to promote law and order in key districts
of Kandahar, supported by justice-sector and corrections capabilities.
15
At present, more than 600 ANP members have been trained in activities supported by Canadian CIVPOL (led by RCMP), while a police
operational mentoring and liaison team (POMLT), led by the Canadian Forces, have improved the ANP’s
ability to survive and begin nascent security activities in two outlying districts.
The current Canadian CIVPOL effort is based on an RCMP management structure, collocated with
the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team. The lead CIVPOL advisor answers directly to the
Representative of Canada in Kandahar, more commonly referred to as the RoCK. The CIVPOL main
effort has been shared between assistance to regional training centres (RTC) in the delivery of a basic
police course (10 weeks), as well as focussed mentoring of ANP within Kandahar City proper.
The small headquarters is responsible for allocating resources and initiating/tracking significant ($4M+)
projects aimed at supporting the emerging police force. This ranges from equipment acquisition and
infrastructure improvements to general policing advice at the provincial level. The CIVPOL organization
has also placed a number of personnel forward in smaller operating bases with a view to mentoring
district-level leadership and investigative capability. CIVPOL are predominantly led by the RCMP and are
supported by additional Canadian civilian police officers. It goes without saying that these are professional
peace officers, bringing a variety of police and investigative experiences to the mentor team. Their primary
constraint, however, is that they do not enjoy complete freedom of movement in less permissive districts
due to national caveats concerning the security of their persons, and the consequent liability.
The POMLT is a composite Canadian Forces subunit, comprised of approximately an equal number of
military police and infantry personnel. These mentors are deployed to the outermost sub-district police
stations (SDPS), where they are embedded with groups of ANP ranging in number from 8 and 30.
Their primary tasks are to mentor assigned ANP in survivability, policing, logistics as well as command
and control. It should be noted that, unlike the better-known American model, the preponderance of
Canadian Military Police are badge-carrying police officers, representing the ideal hybrid of soldier /
peace officer to be employed in this environment. The current composition is approximately 2/3 Regular
Force (badge-carrying peace officers) and 1/3 Reserve Force (not all badge-carrying).www.armyforces.gc.ca/caj

109
 ARTICLES
Of interest is the number of Reserve MP who are CIVPOL in their daily professions in Canada.
What primarily differentiates MP from CIVPOL are enhanced training in small-unit leadership
Figure 3: 77 Bravo, a POMLT in Pashmul, Zharey, poses with their
assigned Afghan police detachment. The team spent six months
embedded with their Afghan colleagues
DSC03883 Taken by: MCpl Gary Obrien, 3 MPU
and combat skills (weapons, communications, medical,
navigation, manoeuvres, and
detention ops) as well as the CF
tenant that they are employed
under an unlimited liability clause,
as are all Canadian Forces soldiers.
A third element that differentiates
MP from CIVPOL, which is
not police specific, is a generic
force protection (FORCEPRO)
organization. Such a capability
is presently employed in support
of the Canadian Provincial
Reconstruction Team; it enables
mobility and provides protection
to a host of civil-military actors,
as well as other government department partners in and about Kandahar City. These include DFAIT,
CIDA, RCMP, Corrections Canada, etc. The FORCEPRO organization is typically based on a mechanized
(armoured) infantry subunit, whose size is dictated by the extent of the protection task. As a combat arms
subunit, they are inherently tactically mobile, self-protecting, and self-sufficient . . . as are the POMLT.
toWarDs an optimal solution

It is clear that certain activities are key to the development and sustainment of a credible and capable
indigenous police force. These include (in no order of precedence) focussed efforts to develop indigenous
leadership, instruction on the collection and synthesis of human intelligence, mentorship by good
example, and literacy training. In order to best influence leadership development there should be a host
nation government-supported effort to talent spot young(er) leadership candidates and provide them with
education and dedicated mentoring. This does not exist presently in Afghanistan. According to authors
Dobbins and Crane, “selecting, training, and mentoring such individuals will shape the resultant force
decisively; it cannot be started too early.”

16
Finally, there is a need for the host nation to be forthcoming
in describing the intended end state for its national police force. Indeed, this remains a subject of much
debate and is summarized by Wilder as the primary inhibitor to institution growth in Afghanistan.
Specifically, “the most fundamental issue that must be resolved for police reform efforts to succeed in
Afghanistan is the need for a shared vision of the role of the ANP . . . the lack of a common strategy, five
years after police reform began, is seriously undermining reform efforts and complicating the task of
coordination among actors in the sector.”

17
Most observers agree that the initiation of an interdepartmental task force for Afghanistan ought to be the
“flagship” for a renewed standard in Canadian whole-of-government cooperation. Indeed, the successes
already achieved by the coordination of departments through Privy Council Office as well as Task Force
Afghanistan are evidence of this positive synergy. An opportunity for significant improvement in the
realm of police capacity building has yet to be exploited, however. Such transformation would entail the
forging of more direct relationships between the office of the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (the senior
Military Police Commander and advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff) and the Executive Branch of
the RCMP on the subject of deployed operations generally, and interoperability specifically.
At a minimum, there is scope to share a better awareness of each organization’s inherent capabilities and
capacities and to develop standardized Canadian mentoring and assessment concepts for application
to failed-state tasks. Should these recommendations be adopted, there will be gains in interagency 110 The Candian Army Journal Volume 13.1 2010  communication, distribution of tasks, and ease of integration into Canadian Forces Task Forces-led
operations due to the inherent familiarity of the military police organization, and the Army, with
this operating environment. Furthermore, military police organizations, as part of the Army’s force
generation effort, could potentially deliver the mandatory pre-deployment training to CIVPOL, through
regional mounting hubs on a mission-by-mission basis. In short, there are many economies to be gained
by harmonizing the collective Canadian approach to police capacity building in failed states. Finally,
whenever CIVPOL and CF police mentors find themselves in the same operational space, it should be
mandated that their headquarters be collocated to ensure timely passage of information, to enable task
de-confliction, and to promote informal interagency learning.

OptimizinG Thee Canadian Model
With an understanding of the players and opportunities, the task turns to developing a Canadian policementoring model for failed states that is relative, responsive, and progressive. Based on the broad range
of international missions, the leading assumption is that building police capacity is a long-term effort.
It follows then, that a realistic model must be able to adjust as the situation changes. In considering this
reality, there are five main criteria that define the mentor-space. These are:
• the nature of the police task;
• the relative maturity or existence of systems such as judicial and corrections;
• the physical threat;
• the degree of integration required by mentoring teams; and
• the assessed state of the indigenous police leadership.
How then do these criteria apply to Afghanistan? Simply put, policing in Kandahar Province is not
policing in downtown Fredericton, or in any other North American city for that matter. Police tasks
in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment are more security-oriented and less focussed on rule of
law. Tonita Murray writes that, “. . . while state security is generally protected by military forces and
intelligence agencies, civil security is the preservation of civilian police. While there is some blurring
at the line of demarcation, as a general principle, police do not fight wars.”
18
This is one conundrum  posed by present-day Afghanistan. More often than not, the ANP are positioned to fight the insurgency,
requiring a rethink of the mentoring methodology. A hasty transition to a rule of law paradigm is also
impeded by illiteracy, a low educational baseline, and public confidence. Although the following list
is not exhaustive, police tasks in COIN tend to revolve around the following activities:
19
improvised explosives awareness, combat first aid, small unit tactics (fire and movement), cordons and searches of
persons, vehicles, compounds, community patrols and information gathering, detainee operations, close
protection, and counterterrorism. It is readily apparent that these tasks are not standard roles attributed
to police in a Western model. Rather, it is only after the environment has been made sufficiently
permissive, that rule of law policing tasks emerge as relevant and attainable. These types of police
activities include criminal investigations, preparation of testimony, observance of rules of evidence,
forensics, and the conduct of grassroots community policing.

In its 2007 report, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) concluded that “a civilian
police force, no matter how well trained and equipped, will have little ability to uphold and promote
rule of law in the absence of a functioning judicial system.”
20
It further concluded that the failure to adopt a more integrated approach to police and justice sectors at the onset, has led to a disparity in
vision and incongruent delivery of resources and observable outcomes. This is certainly the case today
in Afghanistan where it is of little value to shore-up evidence for a tribunal which most ANP and
citizenry know will not occur. Similarly, although much emphasis has been placed on professionalizing
corrections institutions in and about Kandahar City, the progress is slow and not paralleled by
neighbouring precincts. Consequently, personnel arrested under suspicion of committing criminal acts
are routinely released back into the community (by Afghan police / security agencies) as there is little
“systems” capacity to process alleged offenders.www.armyforces.gc.ca/caj

111
 ARTICLES
One has but to scan the world media to view a well-documented account of the present threat in Afghanistan, particularly the southern region that encompasses the Province of Kandahar. Indeed, by mid-January 2010, Canada has given 139 sons and daughters to the Afghan cause. Threat, more than any other factor, influences actions or initiatives in this type of failed state. Mobility is impaired. Forces, both military and humanitarian, require “hardening” by way  of armour, ordinance, or the engagement of Figure 4: Cpl Martin (MP) oversees range activity and marksmanship training DSCF1101 Taken by: Cpl Bucci, 2 MPU private security companies. The simple act of transiting a district by vehicle becomes the subject of much preparation and great diligence. Communities and interpreters are threatened for supporting the “infidel” 21  from outside (coalition) and within (ANSF). As such, the change in prevailing threat
conditions is one of the primary criteria that should be considered when deciding the most appropriate
mentoring mix for emerging police forces.

There is a continuum of mentoring integration from embedded mentors on the left of the scale to the
less-intimate mobile mentoring and site inspection visits on the right. For most practical purposes, the
current need in emerging districts is the embedded approach. At the risk of trivializing other nations’
mentoring contributions, I will stay clear of direct examples. Suffice to say, however, the only mentoring
model that has yielded substantial results in dangerous regions such as Kandahar Province is the direct
and affiliated embedded approach. This model is most successful for a variety of reasons: namely, the
provision of enhanced protection and motivation, the provision of visible role models, and ever-present
oversight to ensure human rights are respected and corruption is not permitted to flourish. There is also
a greater sentiment of commitment to outcomes that permeates a cohabitant relationship. As capabilities
grow in concert with their own leadership and initiative, indigenous forces can be weaned from such
integral mentorship, provided that logistical or tactical dependencies have not been permitted to take
root. At end state, the requirement for routine site inspections should be all that is required to ensure
compliance with established policies and practices, as is the case with nearly all accredited police
forces worldwide.

The leading lesson to be drawn from the writings on police reform in Malaya, Cyprus, Africa, Kosovo,
and Iraq is the absolute requirement to encourage and enable solid indigenous leadership. As long as
there is not a purpose-built leadership-training program for the ANP, the prevailing cycle of nepotism
and poor leadership will never be broken. Also key in the early stage of nation building is the ability for
third-party neutrals (in this case, Canadian police mentors) to be able to talent spot young men and
women who show potential to become educated and otherwise lead and take care of the ANP assigned
to their charge. Ideally, these candidates could be fed into a training system that would prepare them
for increasing degrees of responsibility from the initial requirement to lead 8–12 ANP, up to provincial
command, or beyond. In order to accomplish this, though, the age-old practice of appointing friends and
relatives to positions has to be ended by government leadership. A recent lesson is the positive response
by certain ANP in Panjwayi District to basic literacy training provided by the local Mula (facilitated
by POMLT). Even if wholesale change is untenable, the training of leaders (whoever they may be)
represents the next and perhaps first quantum leap in Afghan police reform.112 The Candian Army Journal Volume 13.1 2010
canaDian options—situation DepenDent

The optimized model proposes three combinations of mentor assets, each recommended for a specific
“stage” or set of environmental conditions, based on the five criteria (police task, systems, threat,
integration, and leadership). These stages are as follows:
• Stage 1: CF Lead / CIVPOL in Secondary Roles. During this stage of nation building, the Canadian
main effort for police mentoring would reside with CF elements, as would the planning and
coordination of mentor plans and activities. The CIVPOL role would be restricted to permissive
or secure zones within the operating environment; it would maximize their skill sets in roles such
as instructing at training centres as well as coordinating diplomatic and development efforts through
DFAIT and governance staff.
• Stage 2: CIVPOL Lead—Supported by FORCEPRO / CF Retains Non-Permissive Areas.
During this stage, CIVPOL assumes the primary responsibility for the mentoring agenda in the
tactical environment. Due to the fact that there will always be a degree of residual threat, there will be
a requirement for mobility and protection support provided by a FORCEPRO element. It is envisioned
that CIVPOL would set mentoring and visit itinerary priorities and FORCEPRO would be responsive
to these requirements, in order to ensure these objectives are met. The CF would continue embedded
mentoring in areas that remain less permissive or along critical approaches to secure centres.
• Stage 3: CIVPOL Operates Independently. As the threat dissipates and the capacity and initiative
of the indigenous force have been proven, the mission may transition to a model that requires no
Canadian Forces support to police mentoring. At this stage, there would no longer be a requirement
for embedded mentoring, which is an extremely manpower intensive endeavour. This state can be
maintained for as long as the Canadian Government wishes to contribute or until such point that the
security situation takes a turn for the worse.
The following table demonstrates the applicability of the three-stage model, assessed against the
five criteria:
Criteria
Stage 1:
CF Lead / CIVPOL
Supporting
Stage 2:
CIVPOL Lead / CF
Supporting
Stage 3:
CIVPOL Independent
nature of the police
task
COIN—Security Rule of Law Rule of Law
systems capacity
(Judicial/Corrections)
Nascent Emerging Proven
threat High Medium—Variable Low
Degree of mentor
integration
Embedded Mobile—Affiliated Mentors Mobile—Site Inspections
state of indigenous
leadership
Poor Emerging Strong
In general terms, it can be said that Canada, in taking an interagency (CIVPOL/CF) approach, has
fielded its police mentoring assets in a reasonable manner. Many of the tactical synergies that have
been achieved, however, have come about as a result of relationships and coordination on the ground,
and not by operational design. It stands to reason that the present model can be shaped to yield even
greater efficiencies in the current conflict and can be used as a baseline to formulate an intervention and
mentoring model for future conflicts. As suggested in the foregoing recommendations, the need for such
transformation, however, must be recognized and initiated at the departmental level. TIMEwww.armyforces.gc.ca/caj

113
 ARTICLES
Only then will the institutional change bear the maximum return on police capacity investment, both in
terms of personnel and resources. To emphasize:
• Institutionalize the direct liaison and partnered planning by DND (CFPM and Army) and RCMP.
• Co-develop a Canadian multi-agency mentoring concept for failed states.
• Exploit opportunities to share operational lessons and to cross-train members (CIVPOL and DND)
on operational skills.
• Exploit opportunities to cross-train CIVPOL and DND junior and senior leaders on each other’s
command, staffing, and planning processes.
• Train (in Canada) and deploy joint or affiliated police headquarters.
In the end, the international experience in the 20th  century has made it clear that the task of nation
building is not for the weak-willed. Likewise, the creation or retooling of indigenous police forces
in support of the national security sector has proven to be a complex and demanding problem into
which Canada has sent its uniformed sons and daughters. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to expect that
a republic such as Afghanistan will remain in “stage 1” for a generation or beyond. The critical policy
path, then, is to harmonize political understanding and partner expectations regarding the pace of
Figure 5: Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Officer, Captain Eric Butts, greets the Malik of Sheykh Mehdi during
a presence patrol in the D and District

Combat Camera IS2009-3062-03 police reform in such environments. Only then will donor contributions remain relevant, responsive,
and effective. The present Canadian approach to police mentoring in Afghanistan is on the right track,
provided that the expected outcomes remain realistic. Of greater benefit, however, is the opportunity
presented by the current situation to become surgically introspective in assessing our collective efficiency
in the police reform endeavour. The ultimate proof of progress will be the emergence of a sound and
formalized Canadian police-mentoring model, supported by institutional change at home. 114 The Candian Army Journal Volume 13.1 2010
enDnotes
1. Transitional in the sense that force composition (CF and CIVPOL) will vary depending upon the permissive/nonpermissive nature of the physical security environment. It also refers to the spectrum of conflict from high to low
intensity, and variations thereof. In essence, as the security situation becomes more permissive, and the whole of Canadian
Government influence grows in a theatre, the requirement for a preponderance of military mentors diminishes. In like
manner, as the indigenous police capacity matures the requirement for CIVPOL influence diminishes over time.
2. M. C. Haims, D. C. Gompert, G. F. Treverton, and B. K. Stearns, Breaking the Failed-State Cycle, An Occasional Paper,
RAND Corporation, 2008, p. xi.
3. K. Menkhaus, “Quasi-States, Nation-Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens,” The Journal of Conflict Studies (2003), p. 10.
4. Mark Turner and Martin Wolf, “The Dilemma of Fragile States,” Financial Times, February 18, 2005 taken from S. Patrick,
Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers,” Working Paper Number 73, Center for
Global Development, 2006, p. 3.
5. The mission statement of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development is to “bring together the
governments of countries committed to democracy and the market economy from around the world to support sustainable
economic growth, boost employment, raise living standards, maintain financial stability, assist other countries’ economic
development and contribute to growth in world trade. The Organization provides a setting where governments compare
policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practices and coordinate domestic and internationals
policies.” Taken from OECD website 20 Jan 2010, at
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
6. D. Hendrickson, N. Ball and L. Williams, OECD: Security System Reform and Governance (OECD Publishing, 2005), p. 16.
7. W. G. O’Neill, Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know, The SecurityDevelopment Nexus Program (New York: International Peace Academy, 2005), p. 1.
8. J. S. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies, The Strategic Studies Institute,
US Army War College External Research Associates Program, 2006, pp. 19 & 23.
9. Ibid., p. 36.
10. Alice Hills, Police Reform in Post-Colonial States, Joint Services Command and Staff College, UK, Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2001, p. 4.
11. T. Pfaff, Development and Reform of the Iraqi Police Forces, The Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College External
Research Associates Program, 2008, p. 8.
12. A. Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit,
2007), p. xii.
13. Ibid., pp. 43–59.
14. Report to Parliament, Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Canada, 2008), p. 37.
15. Report to Parliament, Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan: Setting a Course to 2011 (Her Majesty the Queen in Right

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